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Domestic Relations
By W. STOKES HARRIS* AND ANDREA K. DONOHO**
The rising divorce rate' has transformed the area of do-
mestic relations into one of the most active in the law. Recent
Kentucky cases reflecting this national trend illustrate that
division of property, and child custody and visitation rights
are frequently the two crucial issues to be resolved in domes-
tic litigation. These two areas provide the focal poiht for this
year's survey of Kentucky family law.
I. PROPERTY DIVISION UPON DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. Status of Property as Marital or Nonmarital
1. Professional Degree
Courts in a number of jurisdictions have been confronted
recently with the issue of whether an educational de-
gree-with its concomitant capacity for increased future earn-
ings-constitutes marital property divisible between the par-
ties upon dissolution of marriage.2 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals was squarely confronted with this question in Inman
v. Inman. At the time of their divorce, the Inmans had been
married for seventeen years. Mrs. Inman worked throughout
most of the marriage, helping to put her husband through
dental school in the early years. Although some property had
been accumulated during the marriage, the marital estate was
so heavily encumbered at the time of separation that the
* Partner in the firm of Miller, Griffin & Marks, Lexington, Kentucky. J.D. 1971,
University of Kentucky.
** J.D. 1980, University of Kentucky.
I See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 40
(100th ed. 1979).
2 See In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1979); Todd v.
Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct. App. 1969); In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75
(Colo. 1978); Greer v. Greer, 510 P.2d 905 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Wilcox v. Wilcox,
365 N.E.2d 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); In re Marriage of Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885
(Iowa 1978); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Wheeler v.
Wheeler, 228 N.W.2d 594 (Neb. 1975); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1975); Hub-
bard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
3 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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couple's net worth was inconsequential.4 The trial court, clas-
sifying Dr. Inman's license5 to practice dentistry as marital
property, awarded the wife most of the marital assets and al-
located to the husband the financial burden of the marital in-
debtedness." On appeal, the court of appeals recognized the
difficulties of treating a professional license (or degree) as
marital property,7 but nevertheless felt that to refuse to do so
in certain instances would be inequitable.' Kentucky thus be-
came the first jurisdiction to expressly classify a professional
degree or license as marital property.9 The court of appeals
4 Id. at 267.
1 "License", "degree" and "education" were used interchangeably by the Inman
Court. However, in the latter part of its opinion, the court distinguishes these terms
from a "professional practice." See id. at 269.
6 Id. at 267.
7 One such difficulty noted by the Inman court was that an educational degree
lacks one of the traditional characteristics of property-alienability.
[An educational degree] does not have an exchange value on an open mar-
ket. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on the death of the holder
and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or
pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of pre-
vious education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be ac-
quired by mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achieve-
ment that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In
our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that
term.
Id. at 268 (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978)).
Perhaps the greatest problem in categorizing a degree as property is the difficulty
of placing a value on the degree. See notes 12-13 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of valuation.
8 578 S.W.2d at 268.
' Although Inman is the only case to date to characterize an educational degree
as marital property, other jurisdictions have not been insensitive to the plight of the
spouse who works while the other spouse obtains a degree. Various approaches have
been used in other jurisdictions to compensate the spouse for her contribution to her
husband's professional degree. The court in In re Marriage of Graham, while explic-
itly refusing to classify a degree as property, considered the working spouse's contri-
bution to the degree as one factor to be considered in the property settlement. 574
P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978). In recognition of the wife's support during the husband's
schooling, the court in In re Marriage of McManama, 368 N.E.2d 953 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977), after dividing the marital property, made an additional cash award to the
working wife to compensate her for her expenditure of marital assets solely for her
husband's education. These approaches, of course, adequately compensate the spouse
only if there is a marital estate to distribute. One jurisdiction has taken an unusual
approach, refusing to consider a degree an item of property but classifying concomi-
tant future earnings as an asset to be distributed upon divorce. In re Marriage of
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primarily was concerned that to hold otherwise where there
had been little marital property accumulated would confer a
"windfall" on the spouse who received the degree or license
while denying the spouse who had contributed to the other's
increased earning capacity the benefit of her "investment". 10
The court made clear that a professional license would not al-
ways constitute marital property. It enumerated several cir-
cumstances where the classification of the license or degree as
marital property and its consequent division would be mani-
festly unfair. For example, where a sizeable marital estate has
been accumulated (present fruits of the license), where recip-
rocal aid was given in obtaining a "saleable skill" or where
there is eligibility for maintenance (future fruits of the li-
cense), the need to classify a degree as marital property may
not arise.11
The unwillingness of other jurisdictions to classify a pro-
fessional degree as property may be attributable in part to the
difficulty in valuation. 2 Two possible methods of valuation
Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
The efforts of the working spouse may also be a factor in awarding alimony.
Greer v. Greer, 510 P.2d 905 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (alimony payments in lieu of rights
in husband's degree not terminated upon remarriage); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d
266, 271 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (Wilhoit, J., dissenting); Moss v. Moss, 264 N.W.2d 97
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (alimony awarded to wife as compensation for investment in
husband's degree, despite the wife's income being greater than the husband's). See
note 10 infra for further discussion of these cases.
10 578 S.W.2d at 268. Typically, in the situation in which one spouse has worked
to put the other through school, she will not be compensated for her efforts by an
award of maintenance as it is unlikely that the spouse could make a compelling case
that she is unable to support herself or that she is otherwise entitled to maintenance.
See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.200 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. But cf. Moss v.
Moss, 264 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (wife awarded alimony as compensation
for "investment" in husband's degree even though wife's income was larger than hus-
band's). In the event maintenance is awarded, absent an agreement by the parties or
an order of the court, it terminates upon remarriage of the wife, precluding full com-
pensation. See KRS § 403.250(3) (Supp. 1978). But cf. Greer v. Greer, 510 P.2d 905
(Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (alimony payments in lieu of rights in husband's degree not
terminated upon remarriage).
11 578 S.W.2d at 269. For an ironic illustration of reciprocal aid, see Colvert v.
Colvert, 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977). There both parties earned professional degrees
during the course of the marriage. The wife was granted an interest in the husband's
degree, but the husband was not awarded an interest in the wife's degree because of
the statutory obligation of the husband to support the wife.
12 See Todd v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr.. 131 (Ct. App. 1969).
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appear to be available: the value of the educational degree can
be equated with the cost of obtaining the education, or in the
alternative, an attempt to calculate the increased earning ca-
pacity attributable to the advanced degree can be made.13 In
addressing this issue, the Inman court determined that the
value of the spouse's interest "should be measured by his or
her monetary investment in the degree, but not equivalent to
recovery in quasi-contract to prevent unjust enrichment.", 4
Mrs. Inman's interest in the license, therefore, was limited to
her out-of-pocket expenses for the direct support and school-
ing of her husband plus interest, with an adjustment for
inflation. 5
The Inman court also distinguished between an interest
in a professional license and an interest in a professional prac-
tice. Notwithstanding the concern that an award of an interest
in both the license and the practice could result in double re-
covery, the court remanded the case to the circuit court to
determine if the wife had made an additional contribution to
the establishment of the practice. 16
Unfortunately, Inman raises more problems than it
solves. The court classified Dr. Inman's dental license and its
future earning capacity as marital property, but one is left
with the question of whether this is truly a landmark decision
or merely a facade behind which to work equity. Moreover, it
should be noted that the aforementioned exceptions may se-
verely limit the applicability of Inman.
13 See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education,
10 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 590, 602-12 (1974) for a detailed discussion of the cost and
future earnings methods of valuation.
14 578 S.W.2d at 269.
15 Id. Despite the apparent rejection of the future earnings valuation method,
the court curiously directed the trial court on remand to ascertain not only the mone-
tary cost of the degree, but also the value of Dr. Inman's increased earning capacity.
Id. at 270.
10 Id. A related issue, not discussed in Inman, is the classification of another
intangible asset-goodwill of a professional practice-as marital property. The trend
is to classify goodwill as marital property and thus subject to division between the
parties in a divorce action. See In re Marriage of Fortier, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (Ct. App.
1973); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1975); In re Marriage of Goger, 557 P.2d 46
(Or. Ct. App. 1976); In re Marriage of Fleege, 588 P.2d 1136 (Wash. 1979). But see
Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
[Vol. 63
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2. Pension Benefits
There has been increasing debate over whether pension
rights are an asset subject to division at divorce. Most com-
munity property jurisdictions hold that vested pension rights
are divisible. 17  Two such jurisdictions, California18  and
Texas, 19 recognize spousal claims to even nonvested benefits.
Moreover, a few common law states have recognized that
vested retirement benefits are a divisible asset.20 In Beggs v.
Beggs,2 a 1972 case involving a basic contributory teacher's
retirement plan, Kentucky aligned itself with those jurisdic-
tions holding vested retirement benefits to be marital prop-
erty. Seven years later in Frost v. Frost,2 2 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals modified this stance and reluctantly refused to
award the wife an interest in the husband's Railroad Retire-
ment benefits, citing the recent United States Supreme Court
case of Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo2" as dispositive of the issue.
In Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court held that the antias-
signment clause of the Railroad Retirement Act of 197424 pro-
hibited the division of an employee's expectation of receiving
benefits under that Act in a state dissolution of marriage pro-
ceeding.25 Although Hisquierdo presumptively affects only
benefits payable under the Railroad Retirement Act, its effect
may be far reaching, precluding division in a dissolution pro-
ceeding of other federal benefits such as Social Security,2 6 mil-
17 See In re Marriage of Fithian, 517 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1974); Ramsey v. Ramsey,
535 P.2d 53 (Idaho 1975); Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So.2d 461 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Otto
v. Otto, 455 P.2d 642 (N.M. 1969); Angott v. Angott, 462 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Ct. App.
1970); Wilder v. Wilder, 534 P.2d 1355 (Wash. 1975).
18 In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976).
" Clearley v. Clearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
10 See Hutchins v. Hutchins, 248 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Kruger v.
Kruger, 354 A.2d 340 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Schafer v. Schafer, 87 N.W.2d
803 (Wis. 1958). But see Ellis v. Ellis, 552 P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976).
21 479 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1972).
22 581 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
23 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
2, 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976).
25 439 U.S. at 590.
26 Umber v. Umber, 591 P.2d 299, 301-02 (Okla. 1979) (citing Hisquierdo for the
proposition that social security benefits are the separate property of the recipient
spouse and are not to be considered in determining a property settlement).
1979-19801
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itary retirement benefits2 7 and benefits payable under an ER-
ISA qualified plan.28 Indeed, state court decisions differ on
the applicability of Hisquierdo.
29
The court of appeals' attitude towards pension benefits
was clearly reflected in Frost when it "caution[ed] ... that
the result was dictated by the atypical circumstances of cover-
age by the Railroad Retirement Act."30 But for the preemp-
tion of the federal statute, the court would have "willingly ac-
cept[ed] [the] contention that ... future retirement benefits
should be treated as marital property."31
27 The issue of the divisibility of military retirement benefits confronted at least
five state courts after Hisquierdo. The Alaska Supreme Court, in Cose v. Cose, rely-
ing on Hisquierdo, held that the federal statutory scheme preempts state law and
prohibits the distribution of military benefits. 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979). Ken-
tucky's intermediate appellate court likewise held that military retirement benefits
were not divisible upon dissolution of a marriage. Russell v. Russell, 27 Ky. L. Sutrr.
6, 2 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1980). California, however, has adhered to its established
law that military retirement payments constitute community property divisible upon
divorce. In Gorman v. Gorman, 153 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Ct. App. 1979), the court held
that Hisquierdo was not controlling as it was based on the unique history and struc-
ture of the Railroad Retirement Act. Likewise, courts in Arizona and Illinois have
held that Hisquierdo is inapplicable to the question of whether military retirement
benefits constitute marital property. Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 600 P.2d 1098 (Ariz.
1979); In re Marriage of Musser, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
28 ERISA (Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974), 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1381 (1976), is a federal regulatory scheme for private pension plans. The Su-
preme Court has yet to address the question of whether ERISA precludes state courts
from dividing benefits payable under such a plan as marital property. In Hisquierdo,
the Court stated that its holding was not indicative of its position in regard to bene-
fits payable under a private pension plan subject to federal regulation, expressly re-
ferring to ERISA. 439 U.S. at 590 n.24.
In Pilatti v. Pilatti, 157 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App. 1979), the California Court of
Appeals held that ERISA does not preempt California community property law as
applied to the division of retirement benefits. "Hisquierdo emphasizes the Railroad
Retirement Act provides a total statutory scheme for the maintenance of a retirement
fund resembling public welfare. The benefits may be modified, or even terminated, by
Congress at any time.... ERISA, on the other hand, merely regulates private pen-
sion programs to prevent their maladministration." Id. at 597.
23 See the cases discussed in note 27 supra for an illustration of the differing
viewpoints.
so 581 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
31 Id.
During the past survey year, the court of appeals had two other pension benefit
cases before it. In Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), the court
held that a vested non-contributory ERISA qualified pension plan was marital prop-
erty. While noting that the pension plan "was part of the consideration earned by the
SURVEY-DOMESTIC RELATIONS
3. Interests in Closely-Held Corporations
During marriage one spouse frequently acquires or ex-
pands an interest in a family owned corporation. Under Ken-
tucky's statute,32 property acquired by a spouse by gift during
marriage will not be classified as marital property. Upon di-
vorce it is therefore necessary to determine whether the inter-
est in the closely-held corporation was acquired as a gift33 or
was received as consideration for services.
In Browning v. Browning,34 at the time of the divorce the
husband owned an undivided interest in mineral property
which he had acquired during marriage in exchange for stock
in a closely-held corporation. Rejecting the husband's claim
that his interest was nonmarital, the court of appeals ruled
that the husband failed to show by clear and convincing proof
that he acquired the property by gift and accordingly held it
to be marital property.35 One year later in Adams v. Adams, 6
the same court, on facts similar to Browning, classified stock
held by the husband in a family-owned corporation as
nonmarital property. In distinguishing its earlier decision, the
court noted that in Browning the work performed by the hus-
band as an employee of the corporation, for which he received
no salary, was consideration for his interest in the corpora-
husband during marriage," it primarily rested its decision on the fact that the plan
was vested, and thus "the husband was entitled to receive monthly payments upon
termination for any cause, with only the amount to be fixed." Id. at 224. Although
Foster's pension plan was qualified under ERISA, the court did not address the issue
of whether the federal act preempted Kentucky property settlement law.
The court of appeals in Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 586 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979),
held that the nonvested amounts in the husband's pension fund were "too speculative
to treat as marital property." Id. at 293. The court noted, however, that the
nonvested fund can be viewed as an "economic circumstance" under KRS §
403.190(1)(d) (Supp. 1978) for purposes of determining a just division of the marital
property. Id.
32 KRS § 403.190(2)(a) (1972).
-3 "A gift in a common, ordinary popular sense is a voluntary and gratuitous
giving of something by one without compensation to another who takes it without
valuable consideration." Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977) (quoting Bowman's Adm'rs v. Bowman's Ex'r, 192 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1946)).
34 Id.
" Id. at 825.
565 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
1979-1980]
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tion, thus precluding its designation as a gift.3 7 Although the
shareholder-husband in Adams was also employed by the
family-owned corporation, he received a salary for his services.
The Adams court felt that this distinction warranted a finding
of a nonmarital gift,38 reasoning that since the husband was
already compensated on a salaried basis, the work performed
could not be consideration for the stock. Unfortunately, as in
Inman, the court of appeals failed to provide any concrete
guidelines for valuing the property interest. Presumably, the
court could turn to an existing buy-out agreement or the fac-
tors listed in Revenue Ruling 59-603' for a determination of
the stock's value.
4. Insurance
Before the 1978 case of Ping v. Denton,40 it was well set-
tled in Kentucky that divorce barred a spouse's recovery as a
designated beneficiary of life insurance on her ex-spouse's
life.41 Such a result was mandated by the now repealed resto-
ration statutes42 which returned to a spouse all property "not
disposed of at the beginning of the action, that he or she ob-
tained from or through the other before or during the mar-
riage and in consideration of the marriage. '42 When the Gen-
eral Assembly repealed the restoration statutes,"4 replacing
them with Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 403.190
which directs distribution of property upon divorce, a ques-
tion arose as to whether this new provision would also divest a
person of the right to collect such life insurance proceeds sub-
sequent to divorce. As recently as 1977, the court of appeals
held that there was "no meaningful change in the effect of the
37 Id. at 171.
38 Id.
3" 1959-1 C.B. 237.
0 562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978).
"I See Shellman v. Independence Life & Accident Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 221 (Ky.
1975); Bissell v. Gentry, 403 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1966); Sea v. Conrad, 159 S.W. 622 (Ky.
1913).
42 1952 Ky. Acts, ch. 84, § 1.
R. PETRIL, KENTUCKY FAMILY LAW § 24.6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
PETRILLI].
"' 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 182, § 29.
[Vol. 68
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new law."'45 Thus it was somewhat surprising when, a year
later in Ping v. Denton,'6 the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the spouse owning the policy could change the benefi-
ciary if he chose to do so, but if no change was made, the
former spouse/beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds.47
The Court's decision raises the question of whether one
spouse's beneficial interest in an insurance policy on the other
spouse's life is marital property and thus divisible upon di-
vorce. While declaring it unnecessary in this case to decide
the question, the Ping Court noted without comment that the
trial court had ruled that such an interest was not property
and therefore not within the purview of the statute.8 Such a
decision seems incongruous in light of earlier cases holding
that a beneficial interest in a life insurance policy with a cash
surrender value is property.49 Moreover, if the policy has been
acquired or maintained with marital funds it should be classi-
fied as marital property and thus should be subject to distri-
bution by the court upon dissolution of marriage. 50
5. Date of Acquisition
The date assets are acquired is determinative not only of
the classification of the property as nonmarital or marital at
the outset of a marriage, but also during its twilight. In Culver
4' Denton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 555 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). Accord
Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Willett, 557 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
46 562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978).
47 Id. at 317.
48 Id.
4' Warren v. Spurlock's Adm'r., 167 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Ky. 1943). The term
"property" has long been broadly interpreted. In a leading Kentucky case, Button v.
Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1946), the Court stated:
The term (property) is therefore said to include everything which is the
subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible
or invisible, real or personal, choses in action as well as in possession, every-
thing which has an exchangeable value, or which goes to make up one's
wealth or estate.
Id. at 69 (quoting Commonwealth v. Kentucky Distilleries & Whse. Co., 136 S.W.
1032 (Ky. 1911)).
50 But see PETRILLI, supra note 43 at § 24.7 (Supp. 1977). Professor Petrilli sug-
gests that a beneficiary's interest in a life insurance policy could be considered a gift
and thus designated nonmarital property. Id.
1979-1980]
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v. Culver,5' the court of appeals held that KRS section
403.190(3), which provides that any property acquired by a
spouse after the marriage but before a decree of legal separa-
tion is presumptively marital property, should be strictly con-
strued.52 Therefore, even though the parties have separated,
any property acquired after the separation but before the
marriage is dissolved or a decree of legal separation is granted
is presumptively marital property. 3 The date of separation,
however, determines the cut-off date of "joint efforts" by the
parties; any appreciation in the net worth of the parties after
the separation which is attributable to the efforts of one of the
parties is the nonmarital property of that party.54 If, however,
the post-separation increase in value results from passive ap-
preciation of marital property, it is considered marital prop-
erty.5 5 While this classification system may work within the
confines of the statute, as a matter of practicality, attorneys
and trial courts need a definite date prior to dissolution to
facilitate settlement negotiations and appraisals by expert
witnesses. The need for a definite date is especially great in
cases involving property such as real estate developments,
stocks, options or futures, the value of which is subject to
rapid change.
B. The Effect of Marriage on Nonmarital Property
Litigation involving property continues to provide many
knotty problems for the courts and the practicing bar. Prop-
erty division in a divorce proceeding is hampered by the un-
certain requisites of the valuation process56 and by the diffi-
51 572 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
&2 Id. at 620.
53 Id.
" Id. at 623.
I' d.
C8 In Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), the require-
ments for valuation witnesses, first enunciated in condemnation cases, were extended
to all valuations in divorce proceedings. In Robinson, the court of appeals held that
ownership of property in and of itself does not qualify a party to testify as to value.
There must be some basis, such as "a knowledge of property values generally" or
being "acquainted with property values in the vicinity," before a party can express
his opinion as to the market value of his property. Id. at 179-80. If inadequate proof
of value has been presented, the trial court is directed to obtain expert opinion at the
[Vol. 68
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culties inherent in tracing nonmarital property. The court of
appeals has been active, if not decisive, in an effort to inter-
pret and consistently apply Kentucky's property division stat-
ute, KRS section 403.190.
The requirement of tracing nonmarital or separate prop-
erty5 7 is a troublesome aspect of the distribution of property;
in fact tracing has been described as "inimical to the spirit of
marriage.15  While KRS section 403.190 does not expressly re-
quire tracing, it has become apparent that for nonmarital
property to remain separate it must be traceable to specific
assets owned at the time of separation.5 9 The recent case of
Allen v. Allen6" represents a retreat by the Kentucky courts
from the strict tracing requirement.
parties' expense or to order the property sold. Id. If the owner possesses personal
qualifications beyond mere ownership, he may testify as to the property's value. Rob-
erts v. Roberts, 587 S.W.2d 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
Such problems are intensified by the current but "universally disapproved" prac-
tice of assigning the "winning attorney" the task of preparing the findings of fact.
Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). While Robinson di-
rected itself to improving the trial court's fact-finding capability, Brunson encouraged
improvement of the trial court's method of recording the facts. The court in Brunson
expressed strong disfavor for the widespread practice of assigning the preparation of
the findings of fact to counsel for the successful party, but intimated that it would be
acceptable for the attorneys to choose from sets of findings submitted by both sides.
Callahan v. Callahan, 579 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) went further in condemn-
ing this practice, holding that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to
draft his own findings.
11 Nonmarital property, by negative implication, is defined in KRS §
403.190(2)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1978) as:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or
in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.
Id.
58 Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (Vance, J., concur-
ring). Judge Vance argued that the interjection of a tracing requirement into the mar-
ital property statute interferes with the spirit of sharing essential to marriage, since
"each partner must keep in the back of his mind the possible advantage to be ob-
tained by keeping up with and being able to trace every penny brought into the mar-
riage." Id.
" See Munday v. Munday, 584 S.W.2d 596 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Brunson v.
Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978).
60 584 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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In Allen, the husband withdrew $22,000 from his retire-
ment plan; of this amount, $5,428.23, the husband's interest in
the plan at the time of marriage, constituted nonmarital prop-
erty. The couple subsequently deposited $8,000 of the with-
drawn cash in a savings account. Commingled with this
amount were the proceeds from the sale of a farm. During the
course of the marriage, money was withdrawn from the sav-
ings account, but the balance never fell below the amount rep-
resenting the husband's nonmarital property.6 1 The court of
appeals ordered $5,248.23 restored to the husband as separate
property, stating, "we think the requirement of tracing should
be fulfilled, at least as far as money is concerned, when it is
shown that nonmarital funds were deposited and commingled
with marital funds and that the balance of the account was
never reduced below the amount of the nonmarital funds
deposited.
'6 2
The decision in Allen is a step in the proper direction.
"The purpose of the classification of property as marital and
nonmarital is to facilitate restoration to each party of his
property which was acquired outside of the marriage and to
divide that which was accumulated during the marriage."
6 3
Thus, regardless of whether property previously owned or
property acquired by gift or inheritance during the marriage
can be strictly traced, the purpose of the distribution statute
would seem to be served by returning the value of that prop-
erty even when the nonmarital property can no longer be
traced.
Allen does not, however, answer the more complex prob-
lem of how the growth during marriage of non-cash,
nonmarital assets is to be treated. Robinson v. Robinson" il-
lustrates the problem caused when nonmarital property is en-
cumbered when brought into the marriage. In Robinson, the
husband brought into the marriage a restaurant purchased for
$30,000, but subject to a lien of $11,000. Prior to the couple's
61 Id. at 600.
62 Id.
e3 Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (Vance, J.,
concurring).
64 569 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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separation, the indebtedness had been paid off through the
joint efforts of the parties. Equating the word "property" with
equity, the court of appeals ruled that the net "equity
[$19,000] in that property shall be considered nonmarital
property at the time of separation in that proportion which
this equity bore to the value of the property at the time of the
marriage [$30,000]. ' 65 Accordingly, 19/30 of the value of the
property at the time of separation was assigned to the hus-
band as nonmarital property.66
The problems of property distribution are compounded
when property bearing a proportional nonmarital interest is
exchanged or sold and the proceeds reinvested during the
marriage.6e In Woosnam v. Woosnam,e8 the wife brought into
the marriage a house with an existing mortgage indebtedness.
The house was later sold and the proceeds, less the balance of
the mortgage, were used to purchase a more expensive resi-
dence. Attempting to devise a method to allow the "spouse
having a nonmarital interest in property at the date of mar-
riage to realize additional appreciation in the value of that in-
terest after reinvestment, in proportion to its value at the
date of separation,"6 9 the Woosnam court formulated a three
step process.
First, the value of the nonmarital interest in the property
" Id. at 181.
" Id. A mathematical representation of the Robinson formula would be:
.Value of Property
Equity in property at time of marriage aie of sea Nonmarital
Value of property at time of sepag interest
marriage ration
This formula is also applicable if the property has declined in value during
the marriage. Note that the use of this formula could result in a party being
assigned less than his nonmarital investment. Assume one party owned a
$40,000 house at the time of marriage with equity of $20,000. At the time of
separation the house had declined in value, being worth only $30,000. The
spouse will be assigned 20/40ths of $30.000 or $15,000 as his proportionate
nonmarital interest-$5,000 less than his pre-marriage investment. Id.
7 Property acquired in exchange for nonmarital property is specifically exempt
from classification as marital property. KRS § 403.190(2)(b) (Supp. 1978).
587 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
" Id. at 264.
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originally brought into the marriage is ascertained as of the
date that property was sold using the Robinson formula. 0
Once this value is calculated, it is used to devise a new ratio:
nonmarital interest in the property sold
purchase price of the second property
The new ratio is then applied to the value of the second prop-
erty as of the date of separation to determine the nonmarital
interest to be restored.
This process may be further complicated when the prop-
erty has increased in value due to the efforts of the spouses.
KRS section 403.190(2)(e) exempts from marital property any
increase in nonmarital property which is not the result of the
joint efforts of the parties during the marriage.7 2 What does or
does not constitute an "increase resulting from team efforts,"
however, has been left for judicial interpretation. The pay-
ment of the balance of the purchase price and the value of
permanent improvements is ordinarily considered by the
courts to be an increase attributable to joint efforts and thus a
marital increase.7 3 In Newman v. Newman,7 4 the court was
presented with the question of whether this principle should
be extended. In Newman, the trial court ruled that the in-
creased value of the family residence which was purchased
71 See note 66 supra for a mathematical expression of the Robinson formula.
71 587 S.W.2d at 263-64. Perhaps the process can be more easily illustrated by an
example. Assume a spouse owned at the time of marriage a house valued at $40,000.
His equity in the property was $20,000 with an indebtedness of $20,000. After the
mortgage was paid off, the house was sold for $60,000.00. The proceeds of this sale
were reinvested in a $90,000 house. At the time of separation, this house was valued
at $120,000. Using the Robinson formula, the nonmarital interest in the first house
would be 20/40ths of $60,000 or $30,000. The new ratio, 30/90ths, would be applied to
the value of the second house at separation, $120,000. Thus, the nonmarital interest
to be assigned would be 30/90ths of $120,000, or $40,000.
7' The Robinson formula was premised on the idea that a spouse's proportionate
share of any increase of value in his nonmarital property should be awarded to him.
Note, however, that income produced by nonmarital property is marital property.
Allen v. Allen, 584 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d
173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
73 See Woosnam v. Woosnam, 587 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Allen v. Al-
len, 584 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Angel v. Angel, 562 S.W.2d 661 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978).
14 78-CA-334-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 597
S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1980).
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with proceeds from the husband's inheritance was nonmarital
and therefore assignable to the husband. On appeal, the wife
argued that the tax payments, insurance premiums and gen-
eral maintenance of the residence were attributable to team
effort and that consequently the value of such payments
should be divisible marital property. Since the asserted pay-
ments did not result in an increase in value, the Newman
court rejected the argument, noting that such expenditures
are usually offset by the benefits derived from the use of the
property. 5
Additionally, the Woosnam court recognized that the
value of improvements to the nonmarital property resulting
from team efforts should be deducted from the property
before ascertaining a party's nonmarital interest in property.7 6
When proceeds from the sale of the property brought into the
marriage have been reinvested in a second piece of property,
the value of improvements to the original property should be
subtracted from the sale price before applying the Robinson
formula." Likewise, the value of any improvements made to
the second property should be deducted from the value of
that property at the time of separation before applying the
proper ratio.
7 8
C. Separation Agreements
Kentucky's "no-fault" divorce act promotes the settle-
ment of marital disputes by agreement.7 9 To effectuate this
objective, KRS section 403.180(2) mandates that the terms of
a separation agreement providing for the disposition of prop-
erty and maintenance shall be binding on the court in a pro-
ceeding for dissolution of marriage, unless there is a finding of
unconscionability.80
75 Id., slip op. at 3-4.
71 587 S.W.2d at 267.
7 Id.
78 Id.
79 KRS §§ 403.110(2), 403.180(1) (Supp. 1978).
80 The term "unconscionable" has been defined as "manifestly unfair or inequi-
table." Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 506 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Ky. 1974). A separation agreement
can also make provisions for child custody, support, and visitation; such terms, how-
ever, are not binding on the court. KRS § 403.180(2) (Supp. 1978).
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Prior to divorce, the parties in Jackson v. Jackson81 en-
tered into a separation agreement in which Walter Jackson
agreed to pay Mary Jackson support and maintenance and
further agreed to pay certain bills. In the ensuing divorce ac-
tion, the trial court adopted the commissioner's finding of fact
which recommended that Mary be awarded no support. As a
result, the court distributed property and awarded mainte-
nance contrary to the terms of the agreement. On appeal, the
wife argued that in the absence of a specific finding of uncon-
scionability, the trial court was bound by the terms of the
agreement. The court of appeals stated that while the word
"unconscionable" should have been used in the findings of
fact, those findings demonstrated a sufficient finding of
unconscionability
82
The correct standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling
on the conscionability of separation agreements was recently
delineated in Peterson v. Peterson.85 In Peterson, the court of
appeals stated that the trial court's findings "should not be
set aside on appeal unless there is some evidence of fraud, un-
due influence, overreaching, or evidence of a change of cir-
cumstances since the execution of the original agreement.""
A more significant aspect of the Peterson decision is the
court of appeals' discussion of the effect of reconciliation on
settlement agreements. Considering the issue for the first time
since the revision of the divorce statutes, the court ruled that
what effect reconciliation has turns on whether the agreement
was fully executed or simply executory.85 If the property set-
tlement was executed, the intent of the parties as to the effect
81 571 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
8 2 The settlement had been based on an understanding that the mother would
have custody of the child; instead the court awarded custody to the father. This cus-
tody arrangement led the court to conclude that the agreement could be viewed as
unconscionable. Id. at 92-93.
83 583 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
8' Id. at 712. The husband in Peterson, understanding well the economic conse-
quences, consented to a harsh settlement, freely agreeing to pay two-thirds of his
salary for child support and maintenance. Even though the court would have set
aside the payments had the amount been ordered by the trial court, it would not
protect the husband from the consequences of a bad bargain without some evidence
of overreaching. Id. at 711.
85 Id. at 709.
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of reconciliation is determinative of whether reconciliation
nullifies the agreement. If, however, the separation agreement
is merely executory, a reconciliation will abrogate the provi-
sions of the parties' agreement;8 a subsequent separation will
not revive the property settlement.
8 7
After making this general statement of the law, the Peter-
son court strained to uphold an executory agreement, holding
that an executory separation agreement is not abrogated un-
less there was mutual intent to reconcile. 8 The Peterson
court went on to find that "brief cohabitation or occasional
sexual relations between the parties" does not evidence such
an intent."9
In Whalen v. Whalen,90 the court of appeals addressed
the corollary question of whether reconciliation agreements
are valid and enforceable in a subsequent dissolution proceed-
ing. After a period of separation, the parties in Whalen en-
tered into an agreement contemplating a resumption of the
marital relationship and providing for a property settlement
should a subsequent divorce result, as it eventually did.9 1 The
husband first argued that if the marital relationship is re-
sumed after execution of the reconciliation agreement, the
property settlement embodied in the contract is nullified. The
court, citing Gordon v. Gordon92 and King v. King,9" stated
that the effect reconciliation would have upon an executed
reconciliation agreement was to be determined from the in-
tent of the parties.9 4 The court also rejected the husband's ar-
gument that reconciliation agreements were void as contrary
to public policy, noting that the law "favors any steps parties
may take to settle litigation, especially those which have the
61 Id. at 709-10.
67 Id. at 710.
83 Id.
"I Id. at 709. The facts of the case show that the Petersons separated and recon-
ciled twice with the total time of "brief cohabitation" amounting to approximately
one month. Because the couple had "merely contemplated" reconciliation, the incor-
poration of the agreement into the divorce decree was upheld. Id. at 710.
00 581 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
1 Id. at 579.
02 335 S.W.2d 561 (Ky. 1960).
11 274 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. 1954).
11 581 S.W.2d at 579.
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effect of reuniting a family."8 5 While the revised divorce stat-
utes do not expressly provide for the use of reconciliation
agreements, Whalen makes it clear that such agreements are
enforceable.
II. CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS
A. Child Custody
Intense battles are often waged by divorcing parents over
the custody of children. The present child custody statute del-
egates to the courts the difficult task of deciding custody
based upon the child's best interest.8 6 In making this determi-
nation, the court may inquire into "all relevant factors.117
KRS section 403.270(2), however, prohibits consideration of
"conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his rela-
tionship to the child."98 With the enactment of this statute,
the General Assembly injected into custody determinations a
qualified no-fault concept.
The purpose of this provision is to focus attention on the
best interest of the child and preclude the introduction into
the custody hearing of all the disputes and grievances be-
tween the spouses that led to divorce. The premise seems to
be that the disaffected spouses are likely to treat each other
badly, even maliciously, but that such conduct will not be
directed toward a child for whom they have affectionD
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently had an opportu-
nity to address the issue of whether KRS section 403.270(2)
prohibits the admission of evidence in a custody dispute of a
proposed custodian's sexual conduct. In Moore v. Moore'00 the
95 Id.
96 KRS §§ 403.260-.350 (Supp. 1978).
97 KRS § 403.270(1) (Supp. 1978).
98 KRS § 403.270(2) (Supp. 1978).
" Dept. of Continuing Legal Education, University of Kentucky College of Law,
Report of Seminar on Domestic Relations, 17 (Dec. 15-16, 1978).
100 577 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1979). Justice Sternberg, dissenting in Moore, argued
that the record revealed not just evidence of the mother's week-long extra-marital
affair but also disclosed evidence of other acts of indiscretion, such as kissing her
paramour in public and spending twenty minutes with him on two occasions in an
unlighted men's restroom. 577 S.W.2d at 614 (Sternberg, J., dissenting).
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father attempted to introduce evidence in a custody dispute
of an out-of-town sexual liason by the mother. The Court held
that unless there is evidence that the illicit sexual behavior
affected the parent/child relationship, such conduct is irrele-
vant and consequently inadmissible. 10 1 Thus, even a pattern
of promiscuous sexual activity seemingly would not be a
proper factor for consideration if such behavior had been cir-
cumspect since, "if a child has no immediate knowledge of or
exposure to parental sexual misconduct, his or her relation-
ship to the parent is presumably unaffected.
10 2
The Moore court also concluded that when all factors
pertaining to parental fitness are essentially equal, "the natu-
ral preference for the mother is in the best interest of the
child."103 In Moore, however, the original custody decree was
granted prior to the effective date of the 1978 amendment""
to KRS section 403.270 and thus was not subject to its provi-
sions. As amended, the statute now requires that in a custody
dispute both parents be given equal consideration, apparently
abrogating the "tender years" presumption.0 5 Under the
"tender years" presumption, the mother of a child under the
age of six, if otherwise a fit parent, is awarded custody unless
the father can prove that she is "unfit or incapable of furnish-
ing a suitable home for the child."106 The recent amendment
which abolishes the "tender years" presumption gives recogni-
tion to the emerging view that both parents are equally capa-
ble of performing child-rearing functions and of providing the
necessary care for healthy child development.
107
B. Visitation Rights
Two recent cases have extended visitation rights with mi-
1o Id. at 614.
102 Moore v. Moore, No. CA-1365-MR, slip op. at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1978),
aff'd., 577 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1979).
103 577 S.W.2d at 614.
1" 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 86, § 1 (effective June 17, 1978).
105 The pertinent language of the amendment is: "and equal consideration shall
be given to each parent." 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 86, § 1 (codified at KRS § 403.270(1)
(Supp. 1978)).
106 PEraI.LI, supra note 43, at § 2.
107 See S. KATz & M. INKER, FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LovERs 325-342 (1979).
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nor children to persons other than the natural parents."' In
Simpson v. Simpson,109 the wife, during a divorce proceeding,
requested custody of her husband's child by a previous mar-
riage or, in the alternative, visitation rights. The trial court
ruled that under KRS section 403.260, which permits persons
other than a parent to institute a child custody proceeding
only if neither parent has physical custody of the child,110 it
was without jurisdiction to decide the custody issue since at
that time the child was living with his father.1 In reversing
the trial court, the Supreme Court noted that subsequent to
the couple's separation but prior to the divorce the child had
continued to reside with the stepmother, being removed by
his father only after the petition requesting custody was
ffiled. 1 2 The Court held that this act of "self-help" by the fa-
ther was not sufficient to divest the trial court of jurisdiction
of the custody issue.113 After deciding the jurisdiction ques-
tion, the Court cursorily denied custody to the mother as a
matter of law since there was no proof that the natural parent
was unfit.
114
A more vexatious problem for the Simpson Court was the
propriety of granting step-parental visitation rights. In decid-
ing this issue, the Court was again faced with a jurisdictional
question as there is no statutory grant of jurisdiction for a
hearing to determine the visitation rights of a nonparent.1 0
The Court held that since there is no statutory prohibition
against granting visitation privileges to a nonparent, a hearing
could be held to determine whether it would be in the best
108 Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979); Sparks v. Wigglesworth, No.
79-CA-83-MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 13, 1979), aff'd mem., 27 Ky. L. SumM. 5, 13 (Ky.
1980) [hereinafter cited as KLS].
'09 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979).
110 KRS § 403.260(4)(b) (Supp. 1978).
111 586 S.W.2d at 35.
112 Id.
123 Id.
114 Id. Before custody is granted to a nonparent, it must be shovm not only that
it is in the child's best interest but also that the natural parent is unfit. Chandler v.
Chandler, 535 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ky. 1975).
115 KRS § 403.320 (Supp. 1978), the only statutory provision applicable to the
granting of visitation rights in conjunction with a divorce, speaks only of "a parent's
visitation rights." Id. (emphasis added).
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interest of the child for the nonparent to be granted visitation
privileges, once jurisdiction is invoked for a custody action
and the nonparent alleges therein that he stands in loco
parentis to the child. 16 The Court buttressed its holding, not-
ing that "[v]isitation is not solely for the benefit of the adult
visitor but is aimed at fulfilling. . . a wholesome contribution
to the child's established close relationship"' 117 and that the
legislature had recognized the importance of the parent-
stepchild relationship in other areas.""' Thus, since the step-
mother had properly invoked jurisdiction for the custody pro-
ceeding," 9 she should have been granted a hearing.
Justice Stephenson, in a vigorous and colorful dissent, ac-
cused the majority of usurping the legislature's prerogative of
enacting statutes. 2 0 He contended that the majority's disre-
gard of the applicable laws had entitled "the butcher, the
baker and the candlestick maker to a hearing on 'visitation'
rights." 121 Despite the concern voiced by the dissent that visi-
tation could be granted to "babysitters, nannies, housekeep-
ers, Sunday School teachers and various others who may have
formed close emotional ties with a child,"' 22 there is an indica-
tion that the holding in Simpson may have a more limited
impact. The Court's holding was premised on the idea that
the relationship between a surrogate parent and child can be
as close as that of a child and his natural parent.22 Thus, the
decision should be read as granting visitation rights only to
nonparents who stand "in loco parentis and who have will-
ingly assumed parental rights, duties and responsibilities to-
ward the child.' 24 An even more limiting aspect of the
Court's holding is that before visitation is granted to one
other than a parent, the nonparent must be "jurisdictionally
1 1 586 S.W.2d at 36.
117 Id. at 35 (quoting Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487, 488 (Okla. 1978)).
Id. at 36 n.2.
,' Id. at 35.
120 Id. at 36 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 35-36.
12, Id. at 36.
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capable of litigating custody."'12 5 Since jurisdiction is available
to a nonparent only if the child is not in the physical custody
of one of his parents, 26 it is unlikely that a nonparent will
often be able to invoke jurisdiction.
In Sparks v. Wigglesworth,127 the court of appeals was
faced with the issue of whether grandparents should be
granted visitation rights over the objection of the custodial
parent. Answering in the affirmative, the court ruled that the
paramount criterion is whether the granting of visitation priv-
ileges is in the best interest of the child. 28
In Sparks, the mother of the child was awarded custody
in the divorce action. Because the father was on active duty in
the United States Navy, visitation privileges were granted to
the paternal grandparents. After the father's discharge from
the service, he failed to support or visit the child, and conse-
quently the mother moved to terminate the grandparents' vis-
itation rights.
29
On appeal from the trial court's refusal to terminate the
grandparents' visitation privileges, the mother argued that
since KRS section 403.320(2) speaks only of parental visita-
tion, it was the legislature's intent to limit visitation rights to
parents 30 The mother also argued that KRS section 405.021,
which grants visitation rights to grandparents when the natu-
ral parent is dead, demonstrates that the General Assembly
knew how to grant visitation rights to grandparents when it
desired to do so. Thus, she argued that in the absence of such
a statutory grant, it is to be assumed that the legislature did
not intend for grandparents to be granted visitation rights. 13
The court of appeals rejected both arguments, stating that the
statutes did not expressly provide for or prohibit the granting
of visitation privileges to grandparents where one parent has
228 Id. at 35.
12 KRS § 403.260(4)(b) (Supp. 1978).
127 No. 79-CA-83-MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 13, 1979) af'd mem., 27 KLS 5, 13 (Ky.
1980).
128 Id., slip op. at 5.
129 Id., slip op. at 2.
13 Id., slip op. at 3.
131 Id.
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voluntarily severed his relationship with the child.13 2 Since
there are instances in which granting visitation rights may be
desirable,133 the court held that the question should be re-
solved by looking to the best interests of the child.
"
In making such a determination, the court of appeals
noted that a trial court should consider "the closeness of the
child's relationship to the nonparent and the love, attention
and guidance which the nonparent may be able to afford the
child . . . [and] whether the grandparent, or nonparent, has
had any previous custodial or extensive visitation relationship
with the child.' 3 5 Another consideration which must be
weighed is the custodial parent's objections to the granting of
visitation privileges to the grandparent. " 6 While these objec-
tions are a consideration, they are not determinative since
"the best interest of the child is nevertheless the paramount
concern. ' 137 The court of appeals concluded that the trial
court judge had correctly weighed the factors and upheld his
granting of visitation rights to the grandparents.13 8
132 Id.
133 Id., slip op. at 4.
134 Id., slip op. at 5.
15 Id., slip op. at 9.
118 Id., slip op. at 7-8.
137 Id., slip op. at 8.
13 Id., slip op. at 10.
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